Reasoning Reason

Thomas Friedman, the renowned columnist for the New York Times, recently wrote an article entitled “Israel’s Goals in Gaza” in which he rightly questions whether Israel strives to educate or eradicate Hamas through its current military endeavors. While he asks the relevant question, he settles for an irrelevant conclusion.

As a consistent reader of Friedman’s op-eds I expected this outcome. Friedman has the incredible talent of identifying and encapsulating the issues that most intrigue the American public—his ability to evince key themes and questions place him in elite company, but he provides no more than an overview of the issues he finds most pressing. His books, The World is Flat and Hot, Flat, and Crowded, exemplify this premise by identifying the influence of globalization and encapsulating how these processes affects his readers. Yet, he ignores the vast majority of the world in his arguments, claiming that the world is “flat” when in reality the world is extremely rough for all but the most affluent people in the global core (De Blij, 2008). Similarly, when analyzing the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in Gaza he arrives at the conclusion that most fits the ideals of his readers: the Western, more specifically American, public. Putting aside the wealth gap between much of the Western World and the rest of the globe, I cannot help but notice the extent to which Friedman’s line of reasoning follows the liberal ideology most associated with his demographic. When analyzing a global conflict, Friedman cannot limit their analyses to one portion of the world and expect the local conclusion to accurately depict a global question.

Friedman begins his article questioning circuitously whether the conflict is territorial or existential; he fails to answer this question. Asking such a question without attempting a response is criminal, especially in such a broad article. To briefly divulge into the question, I first acknowledge that the answer lies in the definition of the origin of the conflict. The most evident territorial aspect of the conflict lies in the “occupied” territories that Israel conquered in the 1967 war: the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. The Balfour Declaration led to the international designation of land to Jews for the creation of the state of Israel, which is often mistaken as a cause of the existential conflict. However, if the validity of the creation of Israel is in question, the validity of each of the countries in the former Ottoman territories would have to be in question as the British designated their lands in the same manner that they designated Israel. Thus, no territorial conflict lies in the creation of Israel, but instead lies in the British partition of the vast region previously occupied by the Ottoman Empire; because all the Ottoman land was under Arab control during the Empire’s long reign, Arab peoples believe that other peoples should not exist on their lands. Because Israel has not returned all of the territories obtained in the ’67 war to the Arab peoples, the conflict could be merely territorial. I argue that the conflict is territorial in symbolism alone. Initially the conflict was existential, but as the generation not of the Balfour Declaration, but instead of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, passes away, the conflict shifts from existentially-driven to prosperity-based. Israel has become the excuse for lack of modernization (not to be confused with liberalization) in Arab society while the relative modernity of Israel similarly fuels the impatience and resentment in Arab nations. The type of conflict reveals the motivations of Hamas and thus greatly affects the outcome of the central question of Friedman’s article: is Israel trying to educate or eradicate Hamas?

Friedman neglectfully concludes that the answer to this question is unknown, but through basic deduction the answer is actually quite apparent. Since the conflict is not territory-driven, as the transfer and ensuing management of the Gaza Strip has evidenced, I do not see Hamas’ intent in its rocket attacks the return of the occupied territories. Instead, Hamas seeks to inflict upon Israel the everyday dejection and disorganization experienced by too many people in Arab countries, as though the distress of Israelis is linked to the prosperity of Palestinians. Perhaps, therefore, if the Palestinians modernized they would end the conflict, but as long as they live excluded from the “flat” world that Friedman wrongly asserts is encompassing the entire globe, Hamas has a vested interest in prolonging the conflict. This point has additional relevance because America and other countries have labeled Hamas as only a terrorist organization, which, while factually true, excludes the more dangerous trait of Hamas: its core is insurgency, not terrorism--hence their victory in the Gaza Elections.

Hamas’ actions match this assessment of its motivation. Because people are invested in the conflict, prospects of trading land for peace exist only when the clashing parties exhaust all other options: hence Arafat’s acknowledgement of the existence of Israel only when he and the PLO were penniless and backed in a corner. Since Hamas would trade peace only for prosperity, an outcome that cannot realistically develop in the short-term, Hamas has no reason to stop firing Qassams into Israel. All entities act in their self-interest, and Hamas is no exception. Because Gaza is not currently modernizing and because Hamas calculates its cause to exceed the worth of the lives of thousands of Palestinians, Hamas can only gain from attacking Israel. Recruiting poses no problem to Hamas, so the loss of a few leaders causes only a minor setback (Arens 2009). The key to this conflict, however, is the inability of the international community to prevent Hamas from taking the resources of the general public. Because Hamas siphons basic goods in an extrapolated situation from civilians, all of the civilians would perish before Hamas would. The well-intentioned international community will not let the people of Gaza die. Yet instead of looking at the issue rationally, the international continues to blame Israel for the deaths and horrible quality of life of the Palestinians in Gaza, and the pressure on Israel, provided the war continues, will augment until the international community hits Israel harshly with negative criticism. All Hamas has to do is wait for this moment and they will have achieved their short-term goal of distressing Israelis and hurting their relationships within the international community. Then, I predict any deterrence the Israelis has against the Palestinians will evaporate and Hamas will ramp up attacks. A ceasefire only postpones the inevitable. No matter what Israel does, no matter how strong the army, no matter how effective the siege, Hamas will always be in control because they are the unconventional, non-state actor in the most densely populated place in the world. Urban environments lead to the worst outcomes for foreigners, a category Israel fits into in this circumstance. As hard as Israel tries to gain the upper hand in the conflict, as they're obviously trying to do now, it won't happen. Not as long as the international community protects, as it should, the lives of Palestinians in Gaza...and especially not as long as Iran feeds the frenzy. Therefore, if Hamas views the war as an abyss into which Israel is falling further with each rocket attack, it will not cease firing—thus I directly address Friedman’s thesis that Israel should educate the Palestinians, not eradicate them.

If Hamas has no reason to end the conflict, Israel's choice between education and eradication is irrelevant. Friedman defines “educating” Hamas as hitting them hard enough only to motivate them not to further attack Israel. Yet if the extent to which Hamas is hit does not affect whether or not it attacks Israel, as my interpretation of Hamas’ motivations asserts, then the extent to which Israel would have to teach Hamas to “educate” them as Friedman suggests reaches the point at which the difference between “educating” Hamas and eradicating Hamas is negligible.

Israel, whether to educate or eradicate, strives to destroy Hamas. Friedman endorses Israel's "educating" Hamas but think that the cost of eradication would be horrific casualties and "Somali-like chaos." Thus I reach the relevant question: Mr. Friedman, if Israel's "educating" Hamas requires the consequences of eradication, would you endorse it?