Reasoning Reason

As White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolton recently declared, either Iran develops nuclear weapons capabilities or the world wages war on Iran. The Bush Administration seeks to create a middle ground through which incentives and disincentives cause Iran to act in its national interests and disband its nuclear program. This middle ground approach is not simple, nor is it new. In fact, since 1979 sanctions have been imposed on Iran and have been ratcheted up gradually with a few large-scales impositions such as in 2003 and 2006. Iranian leadership has worked around any sanctions imposed upon their country, narrowing the parameters for achieving middle-ground solutions. The big question, therefore, is simple; yet it reflect many nuances that makes dealing with the Islamic Republic of Iran significantly more difficult than dealing with Libya or North Korea: How should the United States, Iran, and other countries act to achieve such a solution?

The United States has already imposed nearly every meaningful unilateral sanction in its arsenal. It has had no diplomatic ties with the Republic since it first imposed sanctions in 1979 and therefore has no meaningful relationship with influential members of the Iranian government and very few speakers of Farsi to aid with diplomatic ties. Therefore, the odds of successful negotiation with Iran are very slim unless significant carrots and sticks are used to coerce Iran into making a deal. In contrast, a vital aspect of dealing with Iran and the Middle East in the future relies on the United States restoring ties with Iran, training diplomats in Farsi and Iranian history, and developing relationships with the Iranian leaders in power (which obviously implies avoiding figureheads such as Achmedinejad and continuing America’s policy of not negotiating with terrorists such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard).

A new Iranian Sanctions Act is on the Congressional floors that would freeze assets of the Central Bank of Iran and cut oil ties with Iran. The former sanction is meaningful as it prevents Iranian leaders from accessing money that goes into their nuclear program. The latter is arguably more meaningful as it prevents the influx of oil to a country that, while naturally oil rich, imports 40% of its oil due to a lack of refining capabilities. An argument against the Act states that both sanctions would hurt an already impoverished populace unnecessarily, but the reality is that the United States will do everything in its power to make these sanctions pointed at leaders supporting the nuclear program, and that Iran has done incredibly little to improve its infrastructure in decades, so the sacrifice of slightly worsening a terrible economy to dramatically improve it should Iran stop its nuclear program may yield more benefits than costs.

Currently the U.S. government, through its 3rd ranking diplomat Burns, is seeking a freeze-for-freeze agreement; simply stated the United States lifts sanctions and Iran stops enriching uranium and building centrifuges. Obviously this plan is merely a plan to turn time on the side of the United States and likeminded countries since time is on Iran’s side as long as they continue to further its nuclear program. Iran has around 3,800 active centrifuges (although Achmedinejad claims it has 6,000), it plans on building about 51,000 more, and Iran is within a year (although more practically a few years) from having a nuclear weapon capable of reaching any country in the Middle East and slightly further.

The answer does not lie in whether or not to use the remaining meaningful sanctions the United States and European Union have in their arsenals (China and Russia are unlikely to assist and frequently veto UN Security Council measures and most other countries are reluctant to become involved). The imposition of these sanctions is necessary if the world wants Iran to give up its powerful bargaining chip. The answer instead lies in when these sanctions are used.

One might argue that all sanctions should be imposed immediately. This action would directly hurt Iran and would likely move Iran to agree to the freeze-for-freeze proposal. Iran and the United States would then engage in more meaningful negotiations and the timetable for Iran to develop nuclear weaponry would shift in the world’s favor. So why isn’t everyone on board? Aside from the relatively invalid argument that it would cripple Iranian citizens (this implies that their government has not already crippled them—although if imposed at once the populace would probably be hurt relatively more than if sanctions were imposed gradually), many politicians understand that the freeze-for-freeze does not resolve any problems. No doubt exists as to the importance of implementing the freeze-for-freeze plan ASAP. However, in imposing each remaining meaningful sanction at once the United States and the EU have no further bargaining chips, whereas the Iranians stall negotiations for the freeze-for-freeze timeframe (I believe the timeframe will be 6 months), and then continues to build its monstrous bargaining chip knowing that the Western World has no more diplomatic options and the United States, its biggest threat, cannot afford to engage in even more military endeavors overseas.

And thus I come full circle. I have no idea what the United States and the EU should do aside from provoking Russia and China to embrace our cause—a serious impracticality. Frankly, I do not think anyone knows what to do. In the meantime the timeline before Iran has nuclear weaponry is constantly shrinking, as are the parameters for a middle ground solution. The United States and the EU should continue their current policy and hope for a positive change in the status quo, but unless one comes soon, Josh Bolton’s options seem to be the realistic outcomes: a nuclear Iran or war.